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I. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of capitalism’s systemic weakness as 
suggested by Minsky (1986:Chapter 10) was very 
popular to explain the 2008 crisis and, more generally, 
economic crises of capitalist systems. In this 
perspective, financial instability and crises are 
endogenous phenomena in a capitalist economy and 
imply tight state intervention. This thesis is an 
alternative of the theory of efficient markets (Whalen 
2012:12). This article shows, however that this 
explanation of crisis only tells one part of the story, 
because Minsky offers “no baseline of equilibrium 
competitive banking system” (White 2015) and does 
not explain “how the economy can enjoy a coordinated 
state or a period of tranquility” (Prychitko 2010:208). To 
this end it raises the question of the determining role of 
the monetary system in the level of instability of 
financial systems. It uses all works which illustrate the 
effects of central banks’ actions on the moral hazard.  
In Minskyian tradition financial instability is an 
endogenous phenomenon. At the origin of a crisis there 
will always be a problem of past financing and 
investment. A crisis for this reason is financial in 
nature. There is a financial crisis once current profits 
produced by investments do not allow facing 
commitments without destruction of capital and/or the 
sale of a part of accumulated assets. Crises in 
capitalist systems would be due to over-accumulation. 
“The economic problem is identified following Keynes 
as “the capital development of the economy” rather 
than the Knightian allocation of given resources among  
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alternative employments” (Minsky 1992:2). Minsky’s 
thesis is then the following: 
Initially investors are cautious. The capital and 
interest are repaid by the borrowers. The financial 
structure is called “hedge finance”. In such a financing 
structure expected current profits are superior to 
commitments. The finance is healthy. A healthy capital 
structure that reflects a low level of debt and a 
corresponding high level of equity. In periods of growth 
and optimism on future profits, the investors are 
tempted however to leave this healthy financing 
structure. They speculate and call upon banks to 
refinance their debt. From healthy finance we pass on 
to speculative finance where the investor, to make his 
payments, continually staggers his debts to meet his 
deadlines. There is then a single step from speculative 
financing offered by the banks to financing based on a 
Ponzi system. In a Ponzi system investors are paid by 
funds obtained by new entries. Once the sums 
obtained from the new entries no longer suffice to 
cover client payments, the Ponzi system enters into a 
crisis. We enter into a financing structure à la Ponzi or 
rotten structure once current profits do not permit either 
to pay the interest nor the capital. The only solution the 
investor has is to increase his debt. This cannot be 
maintained indefinitely; there is a time when the banker 
decides not to lend anymore, which leads to a crisis. 
During the 2008 subprime crisis we passed from a 
healthy financing structure to a Ponzi structure. The 
banks first sold subprime credits to solvable 
households and then to households less and less 
solvable. The risks of insolvability were then hidden by 
possibilities offered by debt securitization. The Minsky 
moment was then inevitable. This moment qualifies as 
the point where over indebted investors are forced to 
sell their assets massively to face their need for cash. 
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This sets off the recession spiral. This Minskian 
explanation of the economic instability of capitalism 
inspires numerous explanations of the crisis which 
uphold the thesis of greed of the capital holders and 
‘adventurism’ of financial institutions (Mathieu and 
Sterdyniak 2009
i
: Crotty 2009). 2008 crisis is the result 
of an endogenous phenomenon which is intensified by 
the process of financial liberalization. Economic 
instability is explained by the two characteristic of 
speculative behavior (greed and adventurism) and in 
fine the creation of bubbles disconnected from the real 
economy. It is because the agents are never satisfied 
with the margins produced by their activities that they 
take ever more risks and that at a given time their 
activities jeopardize the whole financial balance of an 
economy. It is a healthy financial structure toppling 
over to a rotten structure which explains the crisis.  
A quick reading of events could make us believe 
that the sub-prime crisis was a Minsky moment. Aside 
from the internal criticism aimed at this interpretation of 
crises (Brossard 1998; Palley 2010) it is difficult to 
believe that the State, and more generally, the 
institutions they protect had no effect on the level of 
instability of contemporary capitalism. At least that is 
what the contemporary theory of cycles (Facchini 2004) 
suggests when used to explain the history of crises and 
the 2008 crisis in particular (White 2008; Salin 2008; 
Horwitz 2008; Facchini 2010; Fillieule 2010:179-180; 
Ravier and Lewin 2012). This aspect, often neglected 
by the modern theory of crises, is nevertheless 
fundamental if we want to understand the real origin of 
financial instability of modern capitalism. It is not 
capitalism that is unstable but capitalism regulated by 
States or crony capitalism. This is the thesis defended 
by this article. It reminds us that the subprime crisis is 
by definition a crisis created by the policy of access to 
property and support for investment (section 2) but also 
that the policies of public support for growth create the 
conditions for great risk taking by investors (Section 3). 
It then shows how the banks manage the risks in a free 
banking system (Section 4) and how the existence of a 
lender of last resort increases the moral hazard and in 
fine financial instability of regulated capitalism (Section 
5). If the investors become adventurers it is because 
the State incites them. To reach towards financial 
                                            
i
The 2008 crisis is firstly explained by macroeconomic imbalances initiated by 
national strategies of pressure on salaries. The effects of this pressure on the 
salaries are not immediate as competivity gains (Germany or China) or the 
development of financialization and credit consumption delay the moment 
when the companies have no more openings. Mathieu Catherine and 
Sterdyniak Henri 2009). 
stability nothing should be expected from public 
regulation, on the contrary we should re-establish 
property rights on the monetary market. This is the 
prescriptive conclusion of this article (Section 5). 
II. SUBPRIME AND POLICY FOR ACCESS TO 
PROPERTY  
Great recession of 2008 like “most of the great 
catastrophes of human history have been government 
failures of one sort or another” (Keech and Munger 
2015:1). Indeed, the subprime crisis is by definition a 
crisis of regulated capitalism because the mortgage 
loans of subprime type are not financial products of an 
unregulated market economy but the products which fit 
into a more general policy of access to housing for the 
poorest social categories. This idea is not new in the 
United States as it originates from the time of the New 
Deal and the creation of the Federal Government in 
charge of housing (Federal Housing Administration 
FHA) (Robinson and Nantz 2009:9). Beginning in the 
30s the FHA guaranteed the loans during the new deal 
of a certain number of agents when they wished to 
become owners of their housing.  
III. ARTIFICIAL SUPPORT FOR INVESTMENT AND 
MORAL HAZARD  
The crisis of 2008 is also the result of a public policy 
support for investment. Firstly, there is an opportunity 
cost of subsidies. The benefits to society if the 
expenditure had been spent otherwise or left in the 
pockets of taxpayers, might have been even greater. 
Secondly, the subsidies benefit specific groups of 
people or voters. Thirdly, these policies increase the 
moral hazard. Moral hazard refers to the fact that 
people tend to engage in riskier behavior when they 
are insured. When the State socializes the risk of an 
economic activity, the firms of this sector start investing 
in more risky projects than normal. Money moves from 
industry, for instance, to agriculture. The result will be a 
rise of farmer loan defaults. That increases the 
potential instability of economic system.  
In an unregulated market economy investors only 
take risks if the amount of profit is high and the 
probability of obtaining it strong enough. This 
anticipation rests upon subjective and objective 
probability, and the awareness that the future is 
radically uncertain. The investor acts with his own 
funds and for this reason remains relatively cautious. 
Faced with this natural caution the legislator who wants 
to support growth by investment can implement rules 
which will limit the investor’s risk and create conditions 
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for the advent of a strong moral hazard. The crisis of 
2008 is also the consequence of such policies which 
have supported artificially the economic growth and 
changed the perception of risks.  
Aside from the investment incentives the creation of 
a central bank e.g. a lender of last resort, is an 
important source of moral hazard and of bad 
investment which in fine leads to great financial 
instability. (White 2008; Salin 2008; Horwith 2009; 
Facchini 2010). Central bank is the lender of last resort 
because it offers loans to banks or other eligible 
institutions that are experiencing financial difficulty or 
are considered highly risky or near collapse. In 
monetary system with a lender of last resort, the safety 
it provides encourages the investors and banks to take 
more risk than necessary. The agents take risks they 
would not if they did not anticipate that a part of the risk 
was covered by the central bank and in fine the 
taxpayer. So while in unregulated capitalism each bank 
supports the costs of credit expansion in regulated 
capitalism with a lender of last resort each bank knows 
that its activities, even the most risky, are covered by 
the central banker who commits to helping them if 
these expectations prove to be errors.  
IV. RISK TAKING IN AN UNREGULATED 
CAPITALISM  
An unregulated capitalism is an economic system 
where the means of production are privately owned 
and operated and where the government exercises no 
level of control over what people can do with their 
property. Unregulated capitalism is not under this 
definition an economic system where the activities of 
bankers and speculator is not regulated e.g. the 
definition of financial liberalization. This is a free 
banking system. Free banking refers to a monetary 
arrangement in which banks are subject to no special 
regulation beyond those applicable to most enterprises 
and in which they also are free to issue their own 
banknotes or paper currency. In free banking system 
there is no lender of last resort
ii
.  
In an unregulated capitalism and free banking 
system, when a banker lends money, he takes two 
types of risk. The first is not to be reimbursed. This was 
observed in the crisis of 2007/8. The holders of 
subprime credit no longer succeeded in paying their 
debt. (There was default of payment). The second type 
                                            
ii
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of risk taken by a banker is to respond favorably to a 
request for a loan from an investor when he has no 
money in the bank. The banker lends more than he has 
in reserve. He operates a system of fractional reserves. 
Indeed, fractional reserve banking is a banking system 
in which only a fraction of bank deposits are backed by 
actual cash-on hand and are available for withdrawal. 
The banker, by a game of book entries, lends money 
he doesn’t have and upon which he will earn interest.  
In monetary system with a lender of last resort, this 
practice is only limited by banks’ obligation to deposit a 
percentage of their outstanding credit with the central 
bank. The percentage is in reality very low. This 
practice has a long history, as even in a gold standard 
system the banker can choose to lend more money 
than his gold deposits. He creates paper money and 
takes the risk of not being able to return their gold to 
his clients if they insist upon being reimbursed in gold 
at the same time.  
This risk is low in an unregulated capitalism or free 
banking regime for three reasons. Bankers in all 
institutional arrangement are tempted to use the 
deposit for themselves. Institutions motivate the 
bankers to perform these actions.. They can charge the 
bankers of theft and can ask them to pay interests 
(Hüslmann 2004). In free banking system the practice 
of fractional reserves is illegal. If the clients learn about 
it, the banker can be condemned (Huerta de Soto 
2011:30). Then the bankers expect this cost by 
covering this risk by a compensation mechanism. 
Under this mechanism, any emission of paper money 
by a commercial bank corresponds to a deposit either 
in the bank that loans or in another bank which is or not 
specialized in bank loans (Timberlake 1984). The risk 
of lack of liquidity is thus limited.  
Lastly it is important to remember that in a free 
banking system the quality of a currency depends upon 
the law of supply and demand (Hayek 1976). The 
evolution of the exchange rate between competing 
currencies provides information on the relative quality 
of the currency. A bank which gives more credit than it 
has in own savings or on deposit risks default. It risks 
devaluation of its currency and withdrawal of clients. 
The stockholders will always be very vigilant about 
such evolution as they will be the first losers in case of 
bankruptcy. The clients are also very attentive to the 
quality of the management of their bank and its 
practices as it is in their interest to deposit their savings 
in establishments that do not abuse the practice of 
fractional reserves.  
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To conclude this point we must remember that the 
banks do not only lend client deposits. They also lend 
their own funds. Bankers and their stockholders are for 
this reason even more vigilant when they engage their 
own funds. A free banking system tends then toward a 
system of reserves where the banker would be legally 
forced to not lend more than he has on deposit and 
where he would be forced by his competitors and his 
stockholders (spurred on by the financial market) to 
watch the quality of his money. 
V. CENTRAL BANK AND FRAGILISATION OF 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
In an institutional arrangement with a lender of last 
resort, the bankers’ economic calculation is modified. 
The dissemination of the fractional reserve practice and 
the safety given by the socialization of risks lead moral 
hazard and in fine easy money and soft budgets 
(Mueller 2001:6). The consequence is financial 
instability (Selgin 2010).  
The risk of not being reimbursed is less common in 
a system where the government supports investment. 
The fact that loans are implemented and supported by 
the government and more generally that all the big 
American banks such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, are 
linked to the government by charters which enable 
government to give them missions which in exchange 
are remunerated by privileges (Robinson and Nantz 
2009; Horwitz 2009:11; Prychitko 2010:219) explains 
why the big banks become less cautious. They know 
that the responsibility for a payment crisis is shared 
with the government which has the power in serious 
crises to use such force, otherwise stated its power to 
raise taxes, to restore the financial balance of the 
economy’s financing system. Fannie and Freddie “are 
not “free market” firms (Horwitz 2009:11) and have the 
status of “Big Players” (Koppl 2001). Central bank is a 
Big Player. It enjoys the discretionary power to 
influence markets while being immune from the profit 
and loss, reward and punishment process” (Prychitko 
2010:219). It encouraged speculative and Ponzi-
financed investment and caused moral hazards. 
Financial instability is amplified and exacerbated by 
credit expansion or the “easy money” policy of central 
bankers (Mulligan, Lirely and Coffee 2014). 
The risk of a bank’s lack of liquidity is also greater in 
a regulated capitalism. On the one hand because the 
practice of fractional reserve is legal (Huerta de Soto 
2011), on the other because private compensation 
chambers are replaced by a bureaucratic organization 
whose interests are very different from those of a 
private banker. And finally, because the legal rate 
prevents the law of supply and demand from putting 
pressure on the money producers to limit their risk.  
The legalization of the fractional reserve banking 
allows banks to issue multiple receipts for the exact 
same reserve. Similar to a Ponzi dynamic, banks lend 
a money they don’t have. This is one origin of the 
financial instability. Fractional reserve banking creates 
an easy money context. New money devaluates 
existing money and creates inflationist tensions. 
Inflation is the first factor of financial instability. When 
people understand that their deposits are not really 
there. They demand their deposits. That induces a 
deflationist pressure and in fine a potential bust. 
Central bank can expect this impact and enforce a zero 
interest rate policy. The consequence of this policy of 
easy money is over liquidity, meaning too much dollar 
or euro. The securitization is a first strategy to withdraw 
from the market the credit they have created and to 
reduce the inflationist pressure. Securitization hides 
monetary inflation. All these consequences distort price 
information and increase strongly the cost of 
coordination in regulated capitalism.  
In regulated capitalism private compensation 
chambers are replaced by a bureaucratic organization 
or a political procedure. Central bank introduced ‘a 
discretionary political element into monetary decision 
making and thereby divorced the authority determining 
the system’s behavior from those who had a self-
interest in maintaining its integrity” (Timberlake 
1984:14-15). Central banker has his/hers own 
motivations, which do not necessarily slow down the 
bankers’ risk taking. The central banker is not, firstly, 
responsible on its own funds as is the banker who 
covers another banker. It uses public funds from taxes. 
The fiscal constraint is, secondly, less immediate than 
the financial constraint. The State can at any time use 
its power of coercion to refinance its banks. It can be 
politically sanctioned for having increased fiscal 
pressure, but this sanction is less immediate and less 
severe than that of a banker who cannot be paid by his 
colleague. He would be ruined and this sanction would 
be immediate and certain.  
The legal rate renders captive all individuals who 
reside on a territory. A payment method has a legal 
rate within a territory if no one can refuse it in payment 
of a debt written in the same monetary unit. The agent 
is then unable to refuse a currency that he feels is of 
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insufficient quality. He cannot refuse a salary written in 
this currency, etc. He is captive of the currency chosen 
by the central banker. This risk is even greater when, 
as a last resort lender, the central banker creates a 
phenomenon of moral hazard (Carilli and Dempster 
2001:322). In a system with a central bank the bank is 
encouraged to practice partial coverage as it knows 
that in case of bank panic or crisis everyone will be 
required to pay for the crisis. The State will increase 
taxes, and the central banker will facilitate the 
refinancing of the banks in difficulty. A virtuous bank 
would not use a means of exploiting profit opportunities 
created artificially by legislation of the practice of 
fractional reserves but would be sure on the other hand 
to pay the costs via taxation and/or weak interest rates 
proposed by the banks who do not try to adjust their 
loans to their deposits. It is the survival of a bank which 
does not develop the practice of partial coverage which 
is at risk.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this short article is not to uphold 
that the capitalist financial system is perfectly stable but 
that it is not fair to link financial instability and 
unregulated capitalism. Unregulated capitalism is not 
perfectly stable or efficient, because market process is 
a “dynamic rivalrous process that unfolds through time” 
(Klein and Klein 2001:6). It is the result of the 
entrepreneurial activity and it is, for this reason, 
unpredictable and inherently imperfect. It is a process 
of essay error and stabilization where recession has a 
cleaning effect. It allows for capital to be reallocated to 
relatively more productive firms which lead to higher 
productivity on average and to higher output in the 
economy. Instability in unregulated capitalism is, for 
this reason virtuous. It is the sign that entrepreneurs 
learn and tries to discover perpetually the preference of 
consumers. 
Regulated capitalism is also instable. But this 
instability is the symbol of government failure and of 
decisions of monetary authorities. Indeed, if the aim of 
Central Bank and government intervention is to 
stabilize economic system, instability is a failure. This 
paper has showed why financial fragility of American 
and developed countries capitalism finds its 
explanation, on the one hand, by the existence of 
central banks and on the other by government support 
policies for investment. Excessive debt and excessive 
investment at the origin of the Minsky moment 
originates from the activity of the lender of last resort.  
The other particularity of the instability in regulated 
capitalism is the role of bust. Bust in this institutional 
arrangement has the same cleaning mechanism, the 
bankruptcy of firms. Easy money, nonetheless, induces 
rents or artificial profits. Then, regulated capitalism can 
protect the rent of banks and all the cronies of bankers. 
Regulated capitalism is a crony capitalism where big-
players use the coercion power of State to limit the 
negative consequences of competition on their interest. 
The effect of these coalition between Government and 
firms is a selection bias. The profit and loss system is 
now a rent (artificial profit), profit and loss. Rivalrous 
process can protect rent and sort-out the good 
entrepreneurs. The impact of very important on the 
dynamic of capitalism and the structure of capital. 
If public intervention encourages financial instability 
of regulated capitalism, more State is not the solution. 
The governments should refrain from intervening in the 
corrective process of recession (Horwitz 2009:14 and 
18). The solution is a longer-term institutional one 
(Horwitz 2009:19; Salin 2010). It is, on the other hand, 
to establish private property right in monetary matters 
to limit the phenomenon of moral hazard and more 
precisely the practice of fractional reserves. In this 
perspective, the institutional change should 1- to 
restore the reserve coefficient of 100%, 2- to give gold 
its role back and 3- to break up the central banks 
(Huerta de Soto 2011:Chapter 9).  
These solutions have never been considered by 
political authorities who think that the origin of financial 
instability is unregulated capitalism and neo-liberal 
policies of the 90s. (Blot and al. 2009; Naszalyi 2012; 
Nakatani and Herrera 2013). As Minsky (1986) upheld, 
governments instead reinforced the role of the bank 
and the constraints written in the existing financial 
regulations, engaged measures to reduce speculative 
behavior and banks’ off shore activities (Cartapanis 
2009, 2011) and put active budgetary and monetary 
policies in place to support economic growth. We know 
though that the prudential rules come into contradiction 
with the insurance mechanisms put into place by the 
central banks. Fixing a minimum level of own funds 
without asking what that means in terms of risk leads to 
the making of an arbitrary decision (Janson 2011). 
Faced with this arbitrary the banks try to go around the 
regulations and are encouraged by a system favorable 
to risk taking. A portion of financial innovations which 
favor financial instability thus find their origin in the 
public prudential rules. We also know that support 
policies on demand increasing public spending have, 
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above a certain level of public spending, negative 
effects (Facchini and Melki 2013). The non-linearity of 
the relationship public spending-growth in production 
renders the positive effects of public spending on 
stability and production levels very hypothetical.  
The totality of these solutions rests on a bad 
diagnosis and leads to maintaining an artificial growth 
model which lengthens the time and the depth of the 
recession (Mises 1977:365-366).  
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